This paper considers product-line expansion in horizontally-differentiated markets and examines conditions under which one firm's product-line expansion can cause all firms to be more profitable. While it may at first seem that a firm's profits will decrease when a competitor expands its product line because the firm's sales will decrease in the presence of the new product, this intuition is incomplete because a competitor's product-line expansion can also soften price competition. Thus, one firm's product-line expansion can cause all firms to be more profitable. This paper seeks to understand the empiricallyrelevant contexts under which we obtain this result. We first provide an analytical model that demonstrates the possibility and mechanism of profit-increasing competitor entry. We then present conditions under which a competitor's product-line expansion increases profits under two common empirical models: the mixed-logit and geographic spatial models. The results suggest that profitincreasing competitor entry is not only a theoretical possibility, but also a realistic empirical prediction that should occur with some frequency.
Introduction
This paper asks how a firm's profits change when a competing firm expands its product line. We consider this question in the context of a horizontally-differentiated product line, and focus our analysis on finding empirically-relevant contexts under which a firm's profits can increase with the expanded presence of the competitor. We do this first by presenting a simple model that provides some intuition for why profits of the non-expanding firm can increase. We then consider the empirical relevance of these results by examining conditions under which a competitor's product-line expansion increases profits under two common empirical models: the mixed-logit and a geographic spatial model of retailing.
The theoretically ambiguous sign of the impact of a rival's product-line expansion on a firm's profit comes from countervailing effects. First, a firm's profits may decrease in the face of a rival's newproduct introduction because the firm will lose sales on some of their items if prices of all other incumbent products remain unchanged. Further, a rival's expansion generally changes market prices, and often the change is in the direction of intensifying competition, driving down margins and decreasing profits.
However, profits can increase when a rival adds a new product into the market if the new product is positioned such that prices of incumbent products increase with the new entry. This comes from the fact that when a company expands its product line in a horizontal dimension, it has an incentive to price its existing products less aggressively in order to avoid undercutting its ability to extract the maximum consumer surplus from its newest offering. This is especially true if the new product largely serves customers that were not previously served by any product, and therefore have a relatively-high willingness-to-pay for the new product. Thus, a firm that introduces the new product can become less aggressive with pricing, which allows its competitors to raise their prices, too. Thomadsen (2005) shows that the magnitude of such a price increase can be very large. This increase in prices can lead to an increase in profits for all firms as long as unit sales for the other incumbent firms do not fall too much. In fact, if the product line extension occurs in a part of the product space that is located away from the locations of the competing firms, then the competing firms may even find that number of units they sell increases due to their competitor's higher prices.
Understanding how a competitor's product-line expansion affects a firm's profits is important for understanding strategic responses in a number of situations. For example, should a firm create a barrier to entry, such as preventing a new product from obtaining access to shelf space in a supermarket, or lobbying to prevent changes in zoning laws that would prevent a competing retailer from opening a second location? Should a firm contest a merger, or fight subsidies that might help a competitor expand their product line? Similarly, understanding when a competitor's product-line expansion might aid your company can help clarify which demand conditions might lead to product-line expansion vs. product-line pruning as an optimal response. Further, several empirical papers (e.g. Toivanen and Waterson 2000 or Eizenberg 2008 ) use the assumption that profits decrease when a competitor offers a new product to identify their model; understanding when this assumption is likely to be valid and when it is likely to be violated is key to properly evaluating the validity of the underlying empirical analysis. Does the theoretical possibility that a rival's profits can increase mean that this will occur in practice? We use two approaches to argue that this does indeed occur. First, we examine the sets of parameters for common empirical models where product-line expansion increases the competing firm's profits. We find that this effect occurs under reasonable parametric values, especially among retail outlets competing in geographic space. Second, we demonstrate that this phenomenon occurs in the fast food industry. Specifically, we show that Burger King's profits can increase because of McDonald's opening up a new location, and demonstrate that BK outlets in Santa Clara County, California, have experienced such increases in profits, although the increases were relatively small.
We also note that this phenomenon is likely to occur in many industries. For example, Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1998) look at what happened when Yoplait introduced its light yogurt -the first light yogurt by a major producer. Dannon, the dominant player, sold 5% less yogurt, while total yogurt sales among all firms increased. However, all prices -both those of Yoplait and Dannonincreased after Yoplait Light's introduction. Dannon's prices increased by over 10%, causing revenues to increase by 5% despite the sales of fewer units. An increase in revenues along with lower costs from lower-levels of production imply that profits increased. While Kadiyali et. al. explain these changes through other mechanisms, all of these effects are consistent with those that would be predicted by commonly-used product-differentiation models. 1 While most of this paper focuses on the conditions under which profits for firm A increase from firm B's product-line expansion, we also note that the new presence of the additional product can cause both firm B's prices to increase, which is beneficial for firm A, and cause firm A's sales to go down as a moderate number of customers switch from A's product to the new one. In this case, the practical impact of firm B's expansion on firm A can be close to zero as both effects approximately offset. This nevertheless goes against the conventional wisdom about the impact of the new-product introduction because in such a case firm B expands its product line in a way that the rival loses moderate levels of customers, yet the firm A is not significantly worse off. 1 Kadiyali et. al. explain the results as occurring because Yoplait light is a complement to regular Yoplait and Dannon (meaning that when Yoplait light is lower priced, people increase their consumption of Yoplait light and also their total consumption of Dannon), and that Yoplait becomes more cooperative in their pricing as measured through a conduct parameter. On the other hand, the results of this paper suggest that their data is consistent with standard Bertrand-Nash competition where Yoplait light and Dannon are substitutes, but that Yoplait light and regular Yoplait are even closer substitutes. This paper fits in a large literature in marketing and economics about competition between firms offering product lines. Most of this literature focuses on firms whose product lines are vertically differentiated, and asks how competition changes the extent of the vertically differentiated product line offered by these firms (Gal-Or 1983 , Katz 1984 , Moorthy 1988 , Champsaur and Rochet 1989 , Gilbert and Matutes 1993 , Verboven 1999 , Desai 2001 , Johnson and Myatt 2003 , Johnson and Myatt 2006 . A common theme in this literature is that firms may choose to either change the qualities of the products they offer, or avoid producing some products altogether, in order to reduce competition and prevent highvalue customers from choosing lower-margin products. Johnson and Myatt (2003) state conditions where the response to entry from a competitor will lead to either product-line expansion or contraction.
There is also a literature on competition between firms with horizontally differentiated product lines. Doraszelski and Draganska (2006) consider duopolistic firms that can offer general-purpose goods or niche goods. They specify conditions under which the firms offer full product lines and other conditions under which the firms offer only partial product lines. Draganska and Jain (2005) study product-line length competition by oligopolistic yogurt firms, where product line length is an attribute of horizontally-differentiated product lines. They find that there are decreasing returns to scale with respect to product-line length, and make recommendations about how to adjust product-line length to competitors' price changes. Draganska and Jain (2006) analyze pricing of horizontally-differentiated product lines and find that there is not much gain from pricing different flavors of yogurt within a product line differently, while there can be significant gains from setting different prices for different product lines. Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009) examine competitive decisions by two ice cream makers about which types of vanilla ice creams to offer in different markets. They find that demand-side factors affect firms' product-line decisions, and that greater horizontal-taste heterogeneity increases firms' incentives to offer a large number of products. Thomadsen (2005) studies competition among geographically dispersed locations of multi-outlet fast food chains. He demonstrates that the multi-outlet nature of retail outlets is important for these firms' pricing strategies: McDonald's and Burger King outlets that have other coowned outlets in the vicinity charge significantly higher prices than the same outlets would have charged if the nearby outlets had instead been operated by different owners.
While these papers form a solid foundation to understanding aspects of competition between firms with product lines, they do not directly address our question about how one firm's profits change when a competing firm expands its product line. However, several papers have asked somewhat similar questions. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) ask how profits change when all firms pre-commit to having only one product. They show that profits are unchanged with such pre-commitment in their model, ignoring fixed costs. Draganska and Jain (2005) conduct a similar analysis for their estimated model of preferences for yogurt, and find that some firms' profits would increase while others would decrease if everyone were constrained to offer one product. However, the changes in profits in these papers are the result of both same-firm and cross-firm effects, not just the direct effect of how the competitor's product line expansion impacts firm profits. Lee et. al. (2009) examine a similar question about how profits change when firms open up new channels of distribution; they present a theory model that shows that if one manufacturer opens an internet channel, while their competitor is not present on the internet, profits for both firms can increase under some parameters because price competition is softened due to the expanding firm wanting to avoid cannibalization across its channels. Finally, Dogan, Haruvy and Rao (2010) consider competition between two firms and study what happens when one or both of the firms can offer price discrimination through rebates. While this is not the same as offering a new product, it is similar to the question posed in this paper because the firm is offering a new option for consumers to choose. The authors find that firms benefit when their rivals introduce such price discrimination, regardless of whether they themselves are offering rebates. Kumar and Rao (2006) find a similar result with data-based pricing strategies.
Our paper is also related to a stream of literature that has demonstrated that entry of new products can increase incumbent firms' prices by causing firms to change from a low-priced mass-market pricing equilibrium to a higher-priced niche pricing equilibrium (see Hauser and Shugan 1983 , Perloff et. al 1996 , Thomadsen 2007 , and Chen and Riordan 2008 . While these papers demonstrate that prices can increase from entry, entry still decreases profits because the increase in prices are not enough to compensate for lost sales from customers that switch away from the incumbent products. Pazgal and Thomadsen (2010) find conditions under which new-product entry can increase all firms' profits, but it is not clear how empirically relevant the conditions for their model are. By contrast, we find empirically common conditions under which product-line expansion will increase all firms' profits. We note that this paper studies conditions under which one firm's product-line expansion increases its rival's profits through a mechanism of Bertrand competition under standard productdifferentiation demand models. One could imagine other ways that one firm's introduction of a new product could help rivals. For example, we assume that all consumers are aware of the presence of all products in the market. In actuality, the introduction of a new product, and any marketing associated with the introduction, could benefit all firms by increasing awareness of the category. Further, the category expansion could stimulate the supply of complementary products, which could benefit all firms. We make assumptions in our analysis that there are no externalities or spillovers from the new-product introduction; however, to the extent that these effects also occur, we should expect to find even more markets where product-line introductions increase all firms' profits.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a basic analytical model to provide insight into when one firm's product-line expansion is likely to increase its rival's profits. Section 3 presents conditions under which this result occurs with a mixed-logit demand model. Section 4 examines geographic retail competition and shows conditions under which one retail chain's geographic expansion increases its competitor's profits. We also demonstrate that there have been instances where an existing
McDonald's franchisee opening a new outlet has increased profits of competing Burger King outlets, according to an estimated model. Section 5 concludes.
Basic Model
In this section, we present a model that provides intuition about when one firm's product-line expansion will increase its competitor's profits. We have two objectives in examining the model. First, the analysis in this section demonstrates the mechanism and feasibility of the result that one firm's product-line expansion can increase its rival's profits. Second, we use the analytical model to gain intuition about the empirical conditions under which we would expect to get this result. While the precise conditions under which the theorems below are proven do not technically hold for all of the models presented in this paper, we demonstrate in Sections 3 and 4 that the results are still valid for empirical models under conditions analogous to those presented in the analytical model.
For all of the analysis in this paper (except for our study of the fast food market in Silicon Valley)
we consider a market with 2 firms, a and b, which offer differentiated products. We assume that, at first, each firm offers one product, a and b1, respectively. We then consider how firm a's profits change if firm b introduces a second product, b2.
Denote the price of product j as P j . We denote the demand for a and b1 when these are the only products in the market with capital Q: Q a (P a , P b1 ) and Q b1 (P a , P b1 ), respectively. Denote demand for a, b1
and b2 when all three products are in the market with lower-case q: q a (P a , P b1 , P b2 ), q b1 (P a , P b1 , P b2 ) and q b2 (P a , P b1 , P b2 ), respectively. We also make two assumptions to simplify our analysis. Assumption A1: Functions Q a , Q b1 , q a , q b1 , and q b2 are continuous along all dimensions, and differentiable except (possibly) at a finite set of discrete points. Further, all own derivatives are negative, and all cross derivatives are positive. Finally,
∑ for all products j and k.
Assumption A2: Each firm has constant marginal costs.
Assumption A1 states that an outlet's demand is more sensitive to its own price than to the prices of the other outlets. In particular, A1 ensures that if all firms raise their prices by a constant amount, total demand must not increase for any outlet. Note that assumption A1 is satisfied for Hotelling-style models with quadratic travel costs and most empirical models, such as mixed-logit demand models. because the demand functions for each firm can be asymmetric to reflect the interpretation of prices being the mark-up over these asymmetric marginal costs.
Each firm sets prices at each of its outlets to maximize the sum of profits across all of its outlets.
That is, firms set prices that satisfy:
where J indexes the firm, and j q represents a generic quantity demand function, represented with uppercase letters when there are only two products on the market and lower-case letters when there are three products on the market, as described above. We can then solve for the first order conditions (FOC) of the firms. When there are only two products in the market, firm b's FOC is
On the other hand, if firm a offers two products, the FOC for product b1 is
Plugging in the corresponding FOC for b2 into this equation yields 2 2 1 1 2
Interpreting this directly is difficult. However, we can impose one more assumption which turns equation (3) into something meaningful.
, and (2) no consumer who purchases a before b2's introduction purchases b2 after b2 is brought to market.
= ∂ ∂ ∂
Assumption H implies that both of firm b's products appeal to similar segments of consumers, while b2 and a appeal to different segments of consumers. One model where assumption H holds is in
Hotelling markets where the market is covered after entry, and where b2 is located on the opposite side of b1 than a, as shown in Figure 1 below. Another example is a vertical differentiation model where the market is covered after entry, and, again, b2 is located on the opposite side of product b1 from product a. 
b2 b1 a
Assumption H does not technically hold for most empirical product differentiation models.
However, in Sections 3 and 4 we will show that we find analogous results to those in Theorems 1 and 2
for empirical product differentiation models under conditions that approximately match those of Assumption H. Thus, understanding how profits change under assumption H is still informative for what occurs under empirical models.
Under H, firm a's customers only substitute between a and b1. Therefore, firm a's profits must increase, decrease, or remain unchanged if p b1 increases, decreases, or remains the same, respectively. This is because if p b1 increases, firm a can sell a greater quantity at any given price than it could sell before, meaning that profits must be higher. An analogous argument can be made about the impact of a decrease in price. This monotonic relationship between p b1 and firm a's profits allow us to analyze how new entry impacts a's profits merely by examining b1's first-order condition.
Under H, it is also easy to determine whether prices for b1 increase because equation (3) becomes
, yielding Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 1: Assume A1, A2 and H. Suppose that the market is covered before and after product b2 is introduced to the market, and that that firms price according to their first-order conditions before and after the new-product introduction. Then prices p a and p b1 , as well as firm a's profits, remain unchanged from b2's entry into the market.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
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Theorem 2: Assume A1, A2 and H. Suppose the market is not covered before product b2 is introduced, but that it is covered after b2 is introduced. Further, suppose that firms price according to their first-order conditions before and after the new-product introduction. Then p b1 and firm a's profits increase.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Technically, the theorems apply under specific conditions that can only be met for some models of product differentiation. However, the conditions for Theorems 1 and 2 can hold in approximation for a much-wider set of models, with analogous results. For example, in mixed-logit and geographic models, all products are substitutes for all other products, although products can be closer substitutes to some products than others. Similarly, the market is never completely covered in these models. Thus, Assumption H and the market coverage assumptions from Theorems 1 and 2 can never hold. However, we show in Sections 3 and 4 that the results of Theorem 2 hold in these empirical models when (1) the new product b2 is located in product space such that it is a relatively close substitute for the firm's other product, b1, but not for the rival firm's product, a, and (2) the new product gains enough of its demand from the outside good. Thus, because analogous conditions give us analogous results in the mostcommonly used empirical product-differentiation models, Theorems 1 and 2 provide intuition about when product-line expansion are likely to increase a rival's profits for a broad set of models.
The theorems also demonstrate the mechanism for how a firm's product-line expansion increases its rival's profits: the firm whose product-line expands, b, increases its price, p b1 , to reduce cannibalization between its two products. In response to this price increase, the rival firm, a, also increases its price, although the magnitude of this price change is generally smaller than that of p b1 .
Further, a gains some customers who were previously indifferent between b1 and a. These results also apply to empirical demand models, although in these models b2 also steals some of a's customers, so the impact of product-line expansion on price and the number of units sold is more ambiguous in those settings.
A Hotelling Line Example
One potential critique of the analysis based on Theorems 1 and 2 is that the conditions in these theorems are not based on market primitives. It is possible that the assumptions in Theorems 1 and 2, 2 Logic similar to that in the proof leads to the following theorem for products where consumers can choose a variable quantity of their favorite product: Assume A1, A2 and H. Suppose that the total quantity sold in the category is unchanged with product b2's introduction. Then p a , p b1 and firm a's profits remain unchanged.
particularly that firms price according to first-order conditions, rarely hold. 3 To assuage these concerns,
we provide an example of a product-line expansion in a Hotelling model that confirms the results of Theorems 1 and 2. The model is standard: consumers are located uniformly on a line segment from 0 to 1.
Each consumer may purchase one unit of one product; if consumer i buys one unit of product j they obtain a utility:
where v represents the utility that a consumer gets from consuming any good in the category, p j denotes the price of product j above marginal cost, and l i and l j represent the locations of consumer i and firm j, respectively. 4 Consumers can also decide to purchase only the outside good and obtain utility U i0 = 0.
Firms compete by simultaneously setting prices in order to maximize joint profits across their portfolio of products. Consistent with the model above, we assume that there are 2 firms, a and b. Each firm initially has one outlet, located at l a and l b1 , respectively, and we analyze how firm a's profits change when firm b adds product b2 at location l b2 . We will use in our example the following locations: l a = ¾, l b1 = ½, and l b2 = 1 / 6 . Note that these locations are consistent with the properties denoted in assumption H.
We note that we do not limit our analysis in this paper to scenarios where firms choose optimal product locations. We do this for several reasons. First, determining the optimal locations for firms is highly dependent upon the exact details of the game being studied. For example, the optimal locations for firms are different if the players play a two-period game, where each firm chooses one location in period 1, and then firm 2 adds a second product in period 2, compared with a 10 period game, where the firms each have one product in the market in period 1, and then firm 2 adds a second product which is present in periods 2-10. 5 Further, many of the attributes that determine the correlation of preferences, which will be the analog to location in the mixed-logit analysis, may be fixed among a firm's products. For example, when Yoplait introduces Yoplait light as discussed in Section 1, the fact that both yogurts are branded as Yoplait means that if some consumers are loyal to the brand name then there will be a positive correlation in preferences for the two products. Yoplait could introduce a light yogurt under a different brand name, but their sales would be significantly diminished. Similarly, technology (or in the retail-location analysis, 3 A firm might not price according to its first-order conditions if it is optimal to price at a kink-point on its demand curve. E.g., consider the firm on a Hotelling line located closest to zero. The firm's demand curve has a kink-point at the price where the market becomes covered on the lower side of the market. If the firm raises its prices above this point, it loses both customers at the edge of the market and customers that are indifferent between the firm and its rival. However, if the firm decreases its price, it gains customers between the firm and its rival, but there are no new customers to gain at the edge of the market. Thus, demand is more price sensitive at higher prices then lower prices. 4 Many papers include coefficients on distance or price. Setting these coefficients to 1 can be done without loss of generality because the different coefficients merely change the currency in which prices are denominated. Footnote 8 provides a specific example. 5 Recent empirical research by Bronnenberg, Dubé and Dhar (2007) and Bronnenberg, Dubé and Dhar (2009) suggests that the long-term game is the right way to model such competition for many industries.
fixed-cost variation in the rents at different locations) may restrict the set of locations from which a firm could choose, and account for locations that would appear to be sub-optimal from a demand-side perspective. The extent of technology restrictions may even be such that the locations that are available to one firm may differ from the locations available to the other firm. For example, Häagen-Dazs may wish to produce an ice cream that is very similar to the chunky flavors of Ben and Jerry's, but they may have a hard time replicating this difficult technology. Similarly, no one has been able to duplicate the flavor of Coca-cola, whose recipe is a closely held trade secret. There are many other reasons firms' products may not be optimal from a demand-side perspective, 6 which is why we do not impose such a condition.
While we do not limit our analysis to just those instances where firms add a new product at a profit-maximizing location, we note that we choose the location of l b2 = 1 / 6 because it represents the optimal placement of b2 conditional on l a and l b1 . 7 Thus, our lack of imposing the optimality in the location of the new-product does not preclude that our results extent to cases where the new product's location is chosen optimally.
Suppose first that v = 1. There exists a location The growing stream of current academic research about the proper way to measure demand and position a new product into a market suggests that calculating demand properly is, at best, very difficult, especially for products that have not yet been introduced into the market. Thus, it seems probable that firms would sometimes locate sub-optimally, especially if relocation is costly. Despite this, prices may be close to optimal, as prices are relatively easy to change and in most models can be obtained through a trial and error process. 7 This can be confirmed by solving the first-derivative of profits for b with respect to l b2 , noting that any location between ½ and ¾ leads to a lower profit (with profits decreasing the closer l b2 is to ¾), and noting that if l b2 > ¾ then profits increase as l b2 increases. The profits when l b2 = 1 / 6 are greater than the profits when l b2 = 1. 
Mixed-Logit Demand
The above results demonstrate that a rival's product line expansion can enhance a firm's profits.
The theorems also suggest conditions under which we are most-likely to see this effect: markets where the new product obtains a significant amount of its demand from the outside good, and where the new product is located such that it competes with the firm's other products but does not compete much with the rival's products. This section examines whether these findings are robust in the sense that they still hold under models of preferences that are often used in empirical work. We focus on mixed-logit demand due to its common use in marketing and economics research.
The results from Section 2 suggest that a new product is most likely to increase a competitor's profits when preferences for the new product are positively correlated with the company's other products, 
where γ represents the mean, σ 2 is a variance parameter and Φ is a correlation matrix, with φ j,k representing the correlation between products j and k.
Consumers can also choose to consume only the outside good, in which case they obtain
This follows the standard normalization in the empirical literature of setting the outside utility to be zero plus an error term.
Given these preferences, we examine the impact of one firm's product-line expansion on the rival firm's profits through market simulation. As in Section 2, we assume that there are two firms, a and b, each initially producing one product: a and b1, respectively. We then consider how firm a's profits change when firm b adds a second product, b2, to the market. As with most empirical papers, we assume that firms sell their products directly to consumers and maximize their total profits by setting prices for 8 As an example, if the true coefficient on price for dollars -conditional on the variance of ε -were 7, one could instead represent utility in a currency with an exchange rate of 7 units per dollar. The coefficient on prices represented in that currency would then be 1. each of their products. We also assume that firms have constant marginal costs, and normalize these costs to be zero without loss of generality, as explained in Section 2.
The simulation results presented in this section are conducted by drawing 100,000 consumers with tastes for each of the 3 products drawn from the model above. We vary the values for γ, σ, Φ a,b1 (the correlation of tastes, ω, between the two incumbent products), Φ a,b2 (the correlation of tastes, ω, between the single-product firm and the new product), and Φ b1,b2 (the correlation of tastes, ω, between the two products belonging to the firm that eventually produces both).
We first demonstrate that firm b's product-line expansion can lead to an increase in firm a's profits. The results from the Hotelling model suggest that if the introduction of b2 leads to increased profits for firm a, product b2 should appeal to a different set of people than those who like product a. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1 . Table 1a presents the percentage change in firm a's profits from the introduction of b2. There are several key points that can be learned from this table. First, given that most of the entries are positive, it is apparent that product-line expansion can increase rival firms' profits when preferences are described by the mixed-logit distribution. Second, for any level of σ, the extent to which profits increase from a rival's product line extension at first increase, but then decrease, in γ. When γ is low, products are competing almost as much with the outside good as with the other products, so the new product introduction has only a small impact on profits. The logic in these cases can be highlighted by thinking about what happens with negative-enough values of γ: in such a case, almost all customers choosing one of the products would only find non-negative utilities from that product and the outside good, so the impact of entry on profits would be zero. When γ is large, the sum of the market shares of the incumbent firms is approximately one before entry. Thus, there is almost no room for market expansion from the introduction of product b2; in these cases, the sales loss from entry is relatively large, and is not offset by higher prices. Similarly, increases in σ (consumer heterogeneity) are also associated with larger profit-increases. This is both because larger σ reinforces the extent to which b2
and a appeal to different customers, and because the amount of market expansion that can occur from new-product entry, holding γ fixed, is larger.
Tables 1b-1d present the percentage changes in p b1 , p a , and q a that occur from b2's introduction. who initially consume b1 instead consume a after the product-line expansion. Further, because b2 and a largely appeal to different segments of consumers, a does not lose too many customers to b2. In these cases, sales increase, which along with the higher prices leads to increased profits.
In order to formalize the impact of these parameters, as well as the correlation parameters φ, in a broader set of contexts than those prescribed by equation (6) Table   2 .
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The results indicate that Φ a,b2 has a larger impact on the percentage increase in profit than Φ a,b1 or Φ b1,b2 , with negative correlations yielding higher percentage increases in profits. A large negative value for Φ a,b2 means that products a and b2 serve fairly different segments, so the new product is unlikely to steal many consumers from a; in this case, a will generally profit from the new entry if it leads to higher prices. Also, firm a gains more from the introduction of the new product if Φ a,b1 and Φ b1,b2 are large. High Φ a,b1 means that a and b1 serve similar segments of consumers, so a is especially likely to benefit if b2's introduction increases b1's price. High Φ b1,b2 means that there is a significant group of consumers who find b1 and b2 to be close substitutes, so a low price on b1 is likely to cause large cannibalization with b2; in this case, firm b has more incentive to increase p b1 , especially to the extent that Φ a,b2 is less than Φ a,b1 .
The average category utility parameter, γ, has, on average, a negative impact on the percentage change in profits. This is consistent with the intuition discussed in Section 2, that when γ is large, most consumers already purchase either a or b1 before b2's introduction, so b2's demand comes predominantly from 9 The number of digits reported in Table 2 reflects the precision of the numbers given the number of equilibria we simulate. The confidence interval represents a change of ±1 in the last digit.
stealing customers from a or b1. Consumer heterogeneity, σ, has a small but positive impact, consistent with the intuition above.
Adding higher-order effects of these variables, as shown in column 2, does not add much explanatory power. The main difference that emerges is the importance of consumer heterogeneity. The impact of heterogeneity by itself (as measured by σ and σ 2 jointly) becomes much smaller once higherorder terms are added; however, we also observe an interaction between γ and σ, meaning that higher heterogeneity becomes more important to leading to increasing profits as γ becomes larger.
An 
Multi-outlet retailers
In this section, we examine a special case of product-line expansion: the opening of an outlet in a new location by a multi-outlet retail chain. Empirical models of geographically differentiated industries combine aspects of the mixed-logit model as well as the Hotelling model. We have already seen that a firm's profits can increase from a rival's product-line expansion under each of these models. The combination of these two aspects also provides a fertile setting for product-line expansion to increase a rival's profits.
We demonstrate that a retailer's profits can increase when its competitor expands the number of outlets it operates in two ways. First, we examine the conditions under which this can occur through a comparative statics exercise similar to the one presented in Section 3. We then examine the fast food market in Santa Clara County, California and apply an estimated demand model to demonstrate that profits increased for some Burger King outlets in response to multi-outlet franchisees opening new
McDonald's outlets in that market.
Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we consider a relatively generic empirical model of geographic competition, and compute the comparative statics of the different factors that impact how opening an additional outlet affects a rival's profits. Let b(j) denote outlet j's brand. Consumers are then modeled as having the following utility: consumer i's utility of consuming from outlet j is
ω ib(j) represent's consumer i's preference for brand b(j). The role of ω here is slightly different than it is in Section 3 because here the preference heterogeneity represented by ω is common for all outlets belonging to the same brand (e.g., McDonald's). We choose to model the heterogeneity this way because we feel that the most-important dimension of consumer heterogeneity is the different preferences consumers have about the different chains. This assumption seems especially reasonable since some heterogeneity for locations within a chain is built into the outlet-specific error term, ε ij , although the model can easily be adopted to handle more-complex substitution patterns. We assume that ω i~N (γ,σ 2 Φ), where
is a correlation matrix. γ represents a constant utility common to all products in the category. The coefficient on price is set to -1 without loss of generality, as explained in previous sections. In the empirical analysis later, we will use different γs for each chain, as well as an estimated price coefficient because the data's prices are denoted in dollars. d ij represents the distance between the consumer and the outlet. Finally, ε ij is an i.i.d., extreme value type I random term, which yields multinomial-logit demands conditional on a household's location and parameters.
In order to analyze how retail-chain expansion affects the profits of incumbents, we consider a linear market from 0 to 100, with consumers located uniformly at integer points. We simulate markets under different parameter values and use regression to describe the comparative statics about how the percentage increase in profits from a rival's product-line expansion changes with the different elements in the model. As in the previous sections, we assume that there are two firms in the market a and b, and calculate how a's profits change when firm b switches from selling only b1 to selling two products, b1
and b2. We place a at the midpoint of the linear market, and randomly draw parameters γ~U [0, 12] , σ~U [0, 5] , φ~U [-0.5, 0.5] , location(b1)~U[0,100], and location(b2)~U[0,100]. For each set of parameters, we simulate 1,000 different values of ω i , and place people with these preferences at each of the integer points on a line. Distance is measured in terms of the number of units traveled. We set t = 0.4, which provides a good balance of comparative statics on a line of this length. Table 3 presents summary comparative statics about the percentage-increase in profits from the new-product introduction, based on 10,000 draws of the parameters above. 10 The results are consistent with the intuition provided by Theorems 1 and 2, as well as the comparative statics from the mixed-logit exercise. In particular, we find that the change in profits for firm a decreases as γ increases, consistent with the result that profit-increasing competitor entry requires that the new product's market share largely come from the outside good; when γ is large, very few consumers choose the outside good even before b2's entry. Further, we see that firm a is more likely to profit from firm b opening the new outlet when b2
locates far from a, but closer to b1. This is consistent with the intuition from Theorem 2 that profitincreasing competitor entry requires that the new product locates in a way that produces a positive correlation in preferences for b1 and b2 and a negative correlation in preferences for b2 and a. As was the case with the mixed logit, we observe that b2 locating far from a is more important than b2 locating close to b1. The correlation in preferences between b2 and a is determined not only by dist (a,b2) , but also by φ.
We observe that b2's introduction is more-likely to increase a's profits if the preferences across chains are negatively correlated, meaning that b2 and a appeal to different segments of consumers. Consistent with the results from Section 3, we also observe that greater consumer heterogeneity (σ) increases the change in profit firm a incurs when firm b opens the new outlet.
Example: The effect of McDonald's Expansion on Burger King Profits
This subsection presents results of an empirical analysis of competition between McDonald's and
Burger King. Our analysis is based on the estimated demand for these products, as evaluated by the mean structural estimates in Thomadsen (2005) . The structural model estimated by Thomadsen is a special case of the model presented in equation (7), with σ 2 = 0; the simulations from Section 4.1 suggest that setting Another test of whether profits can increase in practice is to apply an estimated empirical demand model to outlets in a data set, and see whether the model predicts that profits increased from actual entry.
We examine this using a dataset of 62 McDonald's and 38 Burger Kings in Santa Clara County, CA and apply the estimated model of Thomadsen (2005) , which also describes the data set in detail. We limit our analysis to calculating the impact of entry from new McDonald's operated by multi-outlet franchisees on the profits of the incumbent Burger King franchisees operating a single outlet. There are up to 13 incumbent single-outlet Burger King franchisees, depending on the date of a particular entry event. We focus on the impact of profits on independent outlets because an increase in an independent outlet's profits also is an increase in that firm's profits, while a multi-outlet franchisee may experience increases in profits in some outlets and decreases in profits in other outlets. We consider all 15 post-January 1, 1975 entries of new outlets belonging to multi-outlet McDonald's franchisees. In total, we can calculate the changes in profits for 116 entry-incumbent combinations.
42% of these observations reveal increased profits, while only 34% led to decreased in profits.
The remaining 23% caused no changes in profits, as would be expected if the new outlet is located sufficiently far from an incumbent outlet. We observe 14 cases where the new outlet was located within 5 miles of the Burger King outlet. In these cases, where one would expect to find effects with larger magnitudes, we observe 4 instances where McDonald's new-outlet expansion had a less than 0.01% effect on variable profits, 3 instances where entry increases variable profits by over 0.01%, and 7 instances where the entries decrease profits by over 0.01%. The mean increase among the 3 instances of profit increase is 0.2%, while the mean decrease among the 7 decreases is -1.6%. The fact that these changes in profits are small reflects a tradeoff: the benefit that the Burger King gets from nearby McDonald's outlets increasing their prices is somewhat offset by lost sales from the presence of the new outlet, leading to opposing effects that approximately offset, either in a somewhat positive or somewhat negative direction. This is especially true in the 14 observations in our data, where we do not see cases where the new
McDonald's outlet entered on what could cleanly be described as the far side of another incumbent
McDonald's outlet, which would be the most-fruitful setting for a profit increase. The largest positive change in profits among independent outlets is 0.3%, from $8471 to $8494 during each decision period, which is still a measurable increase in profits. 11, 12 The largest decline is -7.2%. Even if we constrain ourselves to the 4 observations where the new entry against an independent Burger King was at a distance of 3 miles or less, which are the situations where one might most expect the product-line expansion to hurt profits, we do not see that such an event is always bad: these 4 observations have profit changes of 0.3%, -0.9%, -2.4% and -7.2%.
The profit numbers reported in this section are variable profit numbers. Variable profits are profits before accounting for fixed costs, which are unobserved in our data. Thus, changes in total profits are likely to be much larger than changes in variable profits. Also, the model used to evaluate profits assumes that σ = 0. The comparative statics presented in Table 3 suggest that this assumption may lead us to under-measure the extent that profits increase when a rival opens a new outlet, especially if the correlation of preferences between the two chains in negative. This seems plausible given that
McDonald's sells fried hamburgers while Burger King sells flame-broiled hamburgers, but the data is not rich enough to well-identify these effects. Nevertheless, given that we have only 10 observations where profits change by over 0.01% in either a positive or negative direction, we still find that the effect of onefirm's geographic expansion on the rival's profits can be positive.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that horizontal product-line expansion can increase a rival firm's profits.
The basic mechanism for this result is that the firm that adds a new product may increase its prices on its incumbent products to avoid intra-firm cannibalization. Thus, product-line expansion can be a mechanism to credibly soften price competition. If the new product is positioned such that it does not steal too many of the rival's customers, the impact of softened price competition can dominate the direct impact of lost sales, and the rival's profits will increase. Even in cases where profits do not rise, the effect of increased prices can approximately offset the effect of lost sales, leading to negligible changes in profits. This basic principle was demonstrated across several classes of product differentiation models, including those 11 The data is price data, so we cannot infer the frequency with which consumers decide which fast food restaurant to patronize. A rough comparison of the revenue numbers to the average sales of an outlet suggests that the decision period might be somewhere between every 3 days to a little more than once a week. 12 There is an outlet in the dataset that experienced a 1.3% increase in variable profits. However, this outlet was owned by a franchisee who owned other outlets that experienced a decrease in profits from that event.
commonly used in empirical research. Our findings are also consistent with the increase in revenues and prices Dannon experienced -despite lower sales -when Yoplait first introduced Yoplait Light, as documented in Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1998 Thomadsen (2005) and the asymmetry in the impact of geography on profits found in Thomadsen (2007) for the same industry. This paper's findings are important to both academics and managers. Understanding how product-line expansion impacts not just the expanding firm's profits, but also that of its rivals, is essential to understanding the nature of competition. Further, understanding whether rival firms' profits increase or decrease is an important input into understanding whether that rival is likely to respond to the newproduct introduction by expanding their product line or by trimming it: For example, if each of the rival's products becomes more profitable after the new product introduction then it is unlikely that the response to the expansion will pruning of the rival's products.
The conventional wisdom that one firm's product-line expansion decreases its rival's profits is deeply embedded in economics and marketing. This conventional wisdom often pervades academic research in the form of assumptions that are adopted by researchers without deep consideration of their applicability. For example, Eizenberg (2008) considers the question of how many products computer manufacturers should offer. One of Eizenberg's key assumptions is that if a product is unprofitable given that the rivals have N products on the market, then that same product must be unprofitable if the rivals instead have N+1products on the market. While this assumption may be valid in Eizenberg's industry, our research demonstrates that this is not an innocent assumption.
Managers can also benefit from our study. The question about whether a company's product-line expansion will lead to a rival's expansion or pruning of their product line is not just an academic one, but also one that managers need to know in order to forecast future sales and anticipate the evolution of their industry. Another key lesson is that managers should not necessarily worry that a competitor's offering of a new product will be harmful; instead, profits may even increase. Even if profits decrease, the decrease will often be small if the competitor's new product does not compete too directly with the manager's products because the competitor will likely increase the prices of their other offerings, which will offset some of the lost sales from the entry. In many cases, a manager who is faced with competitive productline expansion may be tempted to pre-empt the entry, or work to lobby a government or a zoning board to prevent entry. Given that these efforts are costly, our paper suggests that in many cases managers should avoid such actions. In fact, in some cases managers should lobby the government to make exceptions to laws and make entry easier for their competitors -even if the action would maintain high entry barriers to the manager's own firm.
Similarly, the mechanism behind our result is that a firm with multiple products on the market will price less-aggressively than two firms with the same products in order to avoid too much cannibalization. This suggests that a company might be better off if two of its competitors merge together, even if the new firm becomes the largest company in the industry. While managers might be tempted to try to sway regulators to prevent such a merger, or to interfere with the merger negotiations in other ways in an attempt to stop the merger, our results suggest that having a large competitor control most of the competing rival products in the market can be beneficial in the sense that the co-ownership makes that company behave less aggressively. Thus, the manager may want to support the merger by competitors, even if the merger will lead to the introduction of the new products.
Finally, we note a potential direction for future research. We have focused most of this paper on horizontal product-line competition. Yet much of the product-line literature focuses on competition between firms that have vertically-differentiated product lines. Theorems 1 and 2 do apply to vertically differentiated industries, but it would be interesting to explore the extent to which these results are empirically applicable to vertical product lines. -9.5 -6.7 -3.9 -1.5 0.3 8 -9.6 -7.2 -4.9 -2.8 -1.0 10 -9.6 -7.6 -5.8 -3.9 -1.9 12 -9.6 -7.6 -6.2 -4.7 -3.1 
